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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Saoman Conteh
On May 8, 2000, in Freetown, Sierra Leone, Saoman Conteh, a journalist
working for the independent newspaper New Tablet, was covering a demonstration outside the residence of Revolutionary United Front (RUF) leader
Foday Sankoh.' Sankoh's bodyguards fired on the crowd, hitting Conteh
twice.2 The injured journalist fell to the ground, where he was trampled by the
stampede of people fleeing the gunfire.' Suffocated, his body was left on the
street for twenty-four hours before he was taken to Connaught Hospital in
Freetown, where doctors pronounced him dead.4 A reporter for nearly 30
years, Conteh, 48, was survived by his wife and their three daughters. 5
B. Kurt Shork
A little over two weeks later, on May 24, 2000, Kurt Shork, a correspondent covering the war for Reuters, was traveling through Rogberi Junction,
Sierra Leone with a group of other journalists and Sierra Leone army soldiers.6
Members of the RUF opened fire on the caravan, killing Shork and Miguel Gil
Moreno de Mora, a cameraman and producer working for the Associated
Press.7 Two other journalists were also injured in the attack.8

See 24 Journalists Killed in 2000 (last visited Jan. 22, 2002), at http://www.cpj.org/
killed/killed00.htm. This alarming article contains details of every killing of a journalist
identified by the Committee for the Protection of Journalists, an organization dedicated to the
physical protection ofjournalists. The Committee to Protect Journalists engages in extensive
research to determine their statistics. When reports emerge that a reporter has been killed, CPJ
extensively investigates those reports and determines the circumstances of the journalist's death
and whether the journalist was killed because of his or her profession. See id.
2 See id.
3 See id.
4 Id.

sId.
6 See

id.

7 Id.
' See id.
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C. Slavko Curuvija
On April 11, 1999, publisher Slavko Curuvija and his wife, Branka Prpa,
were brutally attacked by two men dressed in leather jackets.9 During what
was apparently a professional assassination, the gunmen pistol-whipped Prpa
and fired several bullets into Curuvija's back and head, killing the journalist.' °
The publisher had recently visited the United States and spoke to Congress in
regard to the oppressive regime of Slobodan Milosevic." Just prior to the
murder, the Serbian state television station broadcasted accusations against the
publisher alleging that he had supported NATO's attack on the country.12
D. Volker Kraemer and GabrielGruener
Two German journalists, photographer Volker Kraemer and reporter
Gabriel Gruener, both of the German magazine Stern, were killed by sniper
fire in Kosovo. 3 The attack on the journalists occurred as they were passing
south of Pristina while returning to Macedonia by car.'4 Their interpreter,
Senol Alit, was also killed in the attack.'"
E. Violence in an IncreasinglyDangerous World
These four examples demonstrate the all-too-common dangers posed to
journalists covering war-town and transitional regions in the fractured modem
world. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), a body that
both monitors and protests violence against journalists, twenty-fourjournalists
were killed in 2000.
The CPJ also recently reported that thirty-seven
journalists were killed in 2001." Furthermore, such violence was not

' See id.

10 See id.

1 See id.
12 See id.

" See 34 Journalists Killed in 1999 (last visited Mar. 3, 2002), at http://www.cpj.
org/attacks99/pages-at99/killed...at99.html.
14 See id.

"s See id.

16 See 24 JournalistsKilled in 2000, supra note 1. This statistic includes journalists
specifically targeted for killing and those caught in the crossfire while covering combat. If it
cannot be confirmed whether the death was in fact related to the journalist's work, that death is
not counted. Id.
17 See 37 Journalists Killed in 2001, at http://www.cpj.org/killed/killed0l.html
(last
modified Feb. 11, 2002).
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restricted to a few countries currently facing military conflict, but occurred
throughout the world, from Brazil to Russia to Sri Lanka. 8
Unfortunately, the quantity of violence directed toward the media is not the
only troubling aspect of such violence in recent years; there is also the
increasing chaos of the world stage. In Sierra Leone, reporters have been
targeted and brutally murdered by both sides of the civil war, the Sierra Leone
Army and the rebel organization, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). 9 A
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO)2° publication entitled The ProtectionofJournalistsbest expressed
the particularly dangerous nature ofjournalists' work over the past few years.
Journalists are exposed to danger not only in covering armed
conflicts, but everywhere. Since the development of acts of
terrorism and violence throughout the world, the journalist
invariably runs the same risks in exercising his profession, no
matter where he may be. He is threatened, arrested, harassed,
tortured, maltreated, beaten, kidnaped, imprisoned and even
murdered. The entire world has become one huge area of
conflict. The journalist is not free to work in peace and
security anywhere, and often has no protection whatsoever.
Everyone, his readers, listeners and television audience expect
him to write, speak and show the honest and unadulterated
truth. But at what price?2 '
Furthermore, violence against journalists affects more than the journalists
themselves. Each and every human right is most endangered and most often
neglected or destroyed in these war-tom regions, and journalists remain the
primary source of accurate information about such occurrences. The private

journalist has the unmatched ability to develop a deep, detailed understanding
"SSee 24 JournalistsKilled in 2000, supra note 1. One journalist, Zezinho Cazuza, a
reporter with Radio Xingo FM, was killed in Brazil. Three journalists were killed in Russia, all
three covering that country's conflict with Chechene rebels. Two journalists were killed in Sri
Lanka, both by a suicide bomber during an election rally. Id.
19See id.
See TIMOTHY G. BROWN, INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS GLOSSARY 69-70 (1984).
UNESCO was one of the first specialized agencies of the United Nations formed after World
War II. It is comprised of representatives from nearly every country in the world, as well as
members from other organizations and U.N. agencies. See id.
" Protection of Journalists, UNESCO Report (Documents on the New Communication
Order, No. 4: Unipup photo reprint, 1982) at 5. 1 UNESCO, NEW COMMUNICATION ORDERNo.
4: PROTECTION OF JOURNALISTS at 5 (1982).
2o
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of a particular event and give an accurate reporting thereof. Reporters are the
story tellers without whom the world can never really be seen or understood.
In fact, much of this violence occurs for exactly this reason. The soldiers
committing these atrocities often know exactly who they are killing. Silence
is the murderers' and the soldiers' best friend, perhaps their only friend. As
a result, this light that shines across the world must not be allowed to diminish
nor dim, or the world will be a poorer and a darker place.
It is the goal of this note to explore this problem with a particular emphasis
on potential methods by which the international community can work to
protect the press. In order to better understand this problem as it exists today,
this note begins with a historical analysis of the development of international
efforts to remedy and prevent it. This analysis is not meant to be comprehensive, but merely to provide some insight into the historical development of this
problem on the international stage. In the interest of continuity, this historical
analysis is organized with an overall topical structure as opposed to a strictly
chronological one. This note then addresses a variety of methods by which the
international community could take action to protect journalists in the future.
It is ultimately the goal of this note to generate workable suggestions for a
future regime, both preventative and punitive. Although it remains unclear
what can be done in the aftermath of one of the single most lethal years for
journalists in the history of the profession, it is deadly clear that something
must be done.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

A. Early History
Although violence against journalists is likely an ancient phenomenon,
coherent international attempts to address the problem have been comparatively late in developing. The first international attempt to address problems
of the press in general occurred in the late nineteenth century.22 These early
attempts were not undertaken by individual governments or by collaborations
among governments, but by large-scale professional organizations of
journalists.' The first and most important of these meetings were the two
International Congresses of the Press, at Chicago in 1893 and Belgium the next

" See Amit Mukherjee, InternationalProtection ofJournalists:Problems Practice, and
Prospects, 11 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COM. L. 339, 347 (1994).
2 See id. at 347.
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year.2' These meetings addressed a variety of issues, including freedom of the
press, the improvement of working conditions and the role of the press in the
international arena.25 Although these discussions were comprehensive, helpful
and long overdue, they failed to result in the development or application of
coherent, international solutions.26
B. League of Nations
Once World War I ended and peace was established, efforts to protect the
press continued. In fact, the political changes in response to the world
provided a powerful new actor for international concerns in general: the
League of Nations.27 The most important attempt by the League to address the
protection of the press was the Conference of Press Experts held in 1927,
which adopted a number of resolutions for consideration by its member
28
states.
These resolutions addressed a variety of broad issues, including the
treatment of foreign journalists and censorship, but also addressed important
proposals for the prevention ofviolence against the press such as identity cards
forjournalists 9 Unfortunately, none of the proposals for the protection of the
press were successful and these efforts ended as the world became engulfed in
World War H.

C. World War II (WWII) & the Geneva Convention
The Geneva Conventions, a group of international treaties designed to
establish firm rules for the treatment of different classes of people during
wartime, were established as a result of WWII.3" After consideration, the

4

Id.

' See id.

26 See id.
21 See generally RUTH

B. HENIG, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1973) (describing the
establishment, organization, and efforts of the League of Nations).
2 See Conference of Press Experts, League of Nations Doc. A.34 1927 G.Q.8 (1927). The
Conference of Press Experts was attended by sixty-three experts, twenty assessors and thirty-five
technical advisers from thirty-eight countries. These included newspaper proprietors, news
agencies, press bureaus and journalists. Id.
29 See

id.

See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field of Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 970; the Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces
at Sea of Aug. 12, 1949,75 U.N.T.S. 971; the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
3
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conventions ultimately classified journalists as civilians.3 Civilians, those
people taking no active part in the hostilities, are provided with a great deal of
protection: 32 "Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors
de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely., 33 The convention specifically proscribes
particular acts done toward civilians.3 4 Conduct condemned by the convention
comprise violence, including murder, torture and cruel treatment." It also
proscribes humiliating and degrading treatment and the carrying out of
sentences or executions not ordered by a regularly constituted court. 6
Although these protections are wide and extremely important, they fail to
address the particular difficulties facing journalists, who are typically more
directly involved with the conflict than are ordinary civilians.31 Many
commentators and journalists have felt the failure to provide journalists with
special status under the Geneva Conventions was a lost opportunity to provide
an added level of protection to journalists. 8
D. The United Nations
Another direct result of WWII was the formation of the United Nations.39
Prisoners of War of Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 972; the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 973.
",See the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
of Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 973.
32 See id.
33 Id. at art. 99.
34 See id.
3S See id. at art.
3.
36 See id.
37 See Tayo Odunlami, JournalistsThat Laws Do Not Protect War Reporters, THE NEWS,

Mar. 13, 2000, available at http://allafrica.comstories/200003130001.html (visited Jan. 24,
2002).
39See id.

A thorough description of the United Nations is absolutely beyond the scope of this essay.
However, a few brief facts are important to note. The U.N. charter was signed at San Francisco
on June 26, 1945 and entered into force on October 24, 1945. See Louis B. SOIN &THOMAS
39

BUERGENTHAL, BASic DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTIONOFHUMANRIGHTS (1973).

Organized largely in response to public outcry at the incredible human rights violations
perpetrated by the Nazis during WWII, the U.N. was founded with humanitarian principles in
mind. See id. In fact, the charter makes it an explicit purpose of the organization to "achieve
international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms." U.N. CHARTER art. 1,para. 3.
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In drafting the convention to create the organization, several articles were
proposed that would have provided special protection tojournalists. Proposed
Article 2(a) of the draft sought the issuance of special identity cards issued by
national authorities. ° Proposed Article 10 of the convention mandated that
parties to a conflict should do everything in their power to protectjoumalists.4
Further, the article mandated that parties grantjournalists a reasonable amount
of protection against the dangers inherent in the conflict, that parties warn
journalists to keep away from dangerous zones and that parties grant identical
treatment to journalists held in internment."2
In the midst of the new international regime ushered in by the United
Nations, new initiatives to protect the press were organized. 3 These initiatives
were in large part motivated by studies prepared by various international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)." One of the first major NGO attempts,
undertaken by the International Federation of Editors-in-Chief, discussed the
issue at its congress in 1957 and then performed an in-depth investigation of
the issue of journalists' safety.' The Federation was ultimately unable to
reach a definite conclusion, however, and referred the issue to the International
Commission of Jurists (ICJ) in 1967.4
E. The Montecatini Draft
The Secretary-General of the ICJ, Sean MacBride, agreed to address the
issue of protection of the press.47 The ICJ prepared a draft international
convention for the protection of journalists. The draft was examined and
amended at a seminar held in Geneva in April, 1968. 49 Members of the
journalistic profession as well as members of other organizations such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were allowed to provide
their comments throughout the meeting."0 This effort culminated in the

'o See Odulanmi, supra note 37.

See id.
See id.
43 See Protection of Journalists, supra note 21, at 30.
"See id.
41
42

See id. The International Federation of Editors-in-Chief largely concluded that it did not
have the power to make pragmatic progress in this area and that any such progress could only
be achieved by international governmental authorities.
41

"See
47 See
48 See
49 Id.
'o See

id.
id.
id.
id.
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Congress of the International Federation of Editors-in-Chief held in
Montecatini, France in May, 1968."
At the meeting, the Preliminary Draft Convention for the Protection of
Journalists on Dangerous Missions (Montecatini Draft) was adopted. 2 The
draft proposed the formation of an International Committee for the Protection
of Journalists on Dangerous Missions. 3 Further, it specified that the
committee would be an independent body made up of press organizations and
placed under the authority of the United Nations.5 ' It was to be composed of
five to seven members chosen by the United Nations Secretary-General from
a list submitted by the designated press organizations." The primary
responsibility of the committee was the issuing of an official identification
card to all registered journalists.5 6 The card would show the journalist's
photograph and state his name, age, nationality, occupation and the name of
the press organization for which he worked." Independent journalists were
also entitled to receive these cards after applying to the committee and
demonstrating their professional qualifications." Any journalist proceeding
on a dangerous mission was supposed to inform the committee. While on such
a mission, a journalist was required to carry the identification and also to
present it upon request.59 Furthermore, in particularly hazardous situations the
journalist was expected to wear a recognizable emblem distinguishing him as
a journalist.'
The draft convention expressly proscribed both the arrest and detainment
ofjournalists for professional activities and prohibited all physical attacks on
journalists, including molestation or harassment. 6' As for enforcement, the
convention mandated that the committee itself would intercede and approach
the de facto authorities in the region where a journalist's rights had been
violated.' 2 It also mandated that parties to the convention adopt any legislative
or regulatory measures which proved necessary for establishing appropriate

" See id. at 30-31.
52 For

the complete text of the draft, see id. at 31-37.

See id. at 33.
$ See id.
"

5' See id.

See id, at 34.
See id.
" See id.
'9 See id.
60 See id.
6' See id. at 35.
62 See id. at 34-35.
'6
57
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penalties for such behavior.6 3 Although the Montecatini draft was wellconsidered and thought out, it was never forwarded to the U.N. for consideration. 64
F. The Safety Committee
The next major NGO attempt to address journalists' safety occurred in
response to an international tragedy: seventeen journalists disappeared in
Cambodia in 1970.65 That same year, the International Press Institute (IPI)
convened two meetings.' In attendance at the meetings, in addition to a
variety of press organizations,6 7 were representatives from the International
Association of Democratic Lawyers, UNESCO, and the International Institute
of Human Rights.68 The meetings led to the creation of an International
Professional Committee for the Safety of Journalists (hereinafter The Safety
Committee).6 9 The Safety Committee had the immediate goal of issuing
identity cards forjournalists on dangerous missions, similar to the plan devised
in the Montecatini Draft, but explicitly limited both by time and location: the
card was only to be issued in Southeast Asia. 0 Along with identity cards, the
Safety Committee also proposed the creation and maintenance of a centralized
file of the journalists most frequently sent on dangerous missions by the
member organizations. 7' Journalists participating in the identification card

63 See id. at 35.
" See Amit Mukherjee, The InternationalizationofJournalists' "Rights": An Historical
Analysis, 4 J.INT'L L. & PRAC. 87, 101 (1995).
61 See Protection of Journalists, supra note 21, at 3 8.
" See id. at 38-41. The stated goal of the IPI is to create an environment in which
governments will hesitate to take action againstjournalists, either through political or physically
violent means. The organization specializes in independent research on the topics of news
sources, foreign news reporting and the general flow of news throughout the world. The
research results in occasional studies of international problems with journalism. For more
information on the organization, see generally Brown, supra note 20.
67 See id. at 38. Press organizations in attendance at these meetings were the International
Federation of Journalists, the International Organization of Journalists, the International
Federation of Newspaper Publishers, the International Federation of Editors-in-Chief and the
International Press Institute.
68 Id.
" See id. at 39. The Safety Committee, headquartered at the "Palais de Nations" in Geneva,
was comprised of one delegate and a deputy from each of the founding organizations. Professor
Urs Schwarz, former president of the International Press Institute, was named Secretary-General
of the Committee.
70 See id.
" See id. at 47.
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program were required to sign a statement that they would only use the card
on professional assignments, they would not participate in hostilities, and they
would neither bear arms nor wear a uniform.72 The Safety Commission
planned to broaden the scope of the identification card program for use
throughout the world as soon as practical but, faced with the extensive task of
communicating with the various authorities in the region to ensure the
understanding and respect for the identity cards, the plan was suspended in
1975 due to the lack of consensus among the countries.73
G. Further United Nations Consideration
The disappearance of the seventeen journalists in Cambodia likewise
brought the issue of the protection of the press to prominence at the United
Nations in 1970, following an appeal by the Secretary-General.74 On
December 9, 1970, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a
resolution on the protection of journalists engaged in dangerous missions."
The resolution, in essence, acknowledged the need for further study and work
on the issue.76 It noted the extant sections of the Geneva Conventions that
could be interpreted to grant physical protection to the press" and urged all
states and authorities to respect those sections. Substantively, the resolution
requested that Human Rights Commission consider the possibility ofpreparing
a draft international agreement on the protection ofjournalists.7 9
Following that resolution, a preliminary draft convention for the protection
of journalists, created largely by the professional journalists' organizations,
was submitted to the Human Rights Commission. 0 The commission
recommended that the resolution be forwarded to the UNGA for further
discussion.8 ' In 1973, the UNGA expressed the desire to adopt a convention
on this question and requested the Secretary-General to transmit the draft
convention to the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Develop72

See id. at 40.

" See U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.2/1990/17, at 4.

74 See ProtectionofJournalistsEngagedin
DangerousMissionsin Areas ofArmed Conflict,
Report of the Secretary-General,U.N. Doc. A/8371 (1971).
75 See G.A. Res. 2673, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 78. U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970), reprintedin Ptotection of Journalists, supra note 21, at 42-45.
76 See id. at 44-45.
77 See id. at43.
71 See id. at 44.
79 See id.
'0 See Protection of Journalist, supra note 21, at 2.
s' See id.
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ment of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts for
consideration. 2 In considering the issue, the Diplomatic Conference proposed
a new article to be included in the Draft Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions. 3 Although the new article did not change the status of
journalists as civilians under the Geneva Conventions, it did mandate the
implementation of an identity card program to ensure that journalists are
recognized as journalists and treated as civilians.8 The question was
examined at the twenty-ninth and thirtieth sessions of the United Nations. 5
Unfortunately, that consideration marked the end of this phase ofconsideration
of this issue by the United Nations. 6
H. Sadi Resolution

The United Nations made no attempt to address this issue again for nearly
two decades. Finally, in 1989, the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection on the Minorities addressed the issue. One
member of the sub-commission, Waleed Sadi, introduced draft resolution
addressing the protection of the press (Sadi Resolution).8 The resolution
included several statements supporting the work of the press in war-tom
regions and requesting that governments around the world go to greater
lengths to protect them. 9 Further, the resolution urged journalists to continue
their difficult work with maximum neutrality and objectivity. 90 Most
importantly, the resolution recommended a special study be donje on the
subject of press protection to examine the possibility of extending additional
protection and assistance to journalists in their endeavor to expose gross
human rights' violations with objectivity and fairness. 9' The sub-commission
approved the Sadi Resolution at its thirty-sixth meeting.' The version

s2 See G.A. Res. 3008, UN GAOR, 27th sess. (1972); see also Protection of Journalists,
supra note 21, at 3.

s See Protection of Journalists, supra note 2 1, at 3.
4

85
86

See id. at 3,61.

Id.
See id.

87 See Draft Resolution on Protection of Journalists, Sub-Commission on
Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 41st Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/SR.36
(1989).
s See id.
89 See id.
90See id.
91 See id.

' See Summary Record ofthe 36th Meeting, U.N. ESCOR, Sub-Commission on Prevention
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supported in the final vote had been altered and slightly weakened from the
original resolution and simply requested that Sadi study the feasibility of
performing additional studies on potential means to extend additional
international protection to the press.93
The Sadi Resolution was completed and submitted to the forty-second
session of the sub-commission in 1990."' The final report focused on the
importance of the press to human rights in general and noted that attacks on
journalists had become an all too frequent phenomenon. 95 Concluding, it
declared that the sub-commission is "duty bound to accord them special
attention and protection in a form that has yet to be articulated and formulated."'
Following Sadi's drafting of the feasibility report, the sub-commission
proposed that he prepare a preliminary study on additional protection for
journalists.9 The resolution prepared by the sub-commission requested
specifically that Sadi address a few particular issues. First, the resolution
requested Sadi analyze the types of violations most frequently made against
journalists.98 Second, it directed Sadi to draft specific guarantees necessary for
the protection ofjournalists." Third, the resolution recommends measures that
the United Nations could take to protect the well-being ofjournalists working
in dangerous and war-tom regions." ° Unfortunately, the sub-commission
never enacted the draft resolution. Consideration was deferred until the next
session of the sub-commission."'0 That deferral marked the last time the sub-

of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 41 stSess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/SR.36
(1989).
9'Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities on its Forty-First Session, U.N. ESCOR, UN. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/58 at 18
(1989).
94 Review of Further Developments in Fields With Which the Sub-Commission Has Been
Concerned, U.N. ESCOR, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, 42nd Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.Y/Sub. 2/1990/17 (1990).
9'See id.

9'Id.
9 See Mukherjee, supra note 64, at 109.
id.
99See id.
9S See

1oSee id.
'01See Decision 1990/116 in Report ofthe Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities in its Forty-Second Session. U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/59.
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commission addressed that particular draft resolution.'02 The deferral also
marked the last time an official sub-commission under
the auspices of the
10 3
United Nations addressed the issue of press protection.
I. UNESCO and the Protection ofJournalists

In addition to those initiatives undertaken by the UNGA itself described
above, the issue of the physical protection press has also been undertaken by
UNESCO.'" The issue was first brought to the attention of UNESCO by the
organization's Director-General Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow at press conferences
during the nineteenth session of UNESCO's General Conference held in
Nairobi in 1976.'0' UNESCO first officially addressed the issue at a colloquium held in Florence in April, 1977. "' The meeting, focusing on communications and information flow in general, discussed the protection ofjournalists
within that context. 10 7 In particular, the working document drafted in that
meeting stated that "protection should be ensured for journalists on dangerous
missions in zones of armed conflict. '0 8
UNESCO next addressed the issue at the twentieth session of its General
Assembly held in 1978.' 9 At that meeting, the assembly adopted The
Declaration on Fundamental Principles concerning the Contribution of the
Mass Media.' 0 In Article II,paragraph 4 of the document, the assembly stated
that, "it is essential that journalists and other agents of the mass media, in their
own country or abroad, be assured of protection guaranteeing them the best
conditions for the exercise of their profession.""' The assembly further
concluded that such a goal was primarily the responsibility of the international
o See id.
'o

See id.

10'See Brown, supra note 20, at 69-70.
'os See Protection of Journalists, supra note 21, at 7.
06 See The Status and Responsibilities of Information Personnel and the Protection of
Journalists in the Exercise of their Profession (OPI-77/WS/3, Paris, Apr. 1977).
107 See id.
log Id.
"oSee Declaration on the Fundamental Principles Concerning the Mass Media (1978) located
in UNESCO's Standard-Setting Instruments, IV.C. (1994). Declaration on Fundamental

Principles concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and
International Understanding, to the Promotion of Human Rights and to Countering Racialism,
Apartheid and Inciterent to War, UNESCO, 20th Sess., at Ari. 1, UNESCORES. 4/9/3/2, 20
UNESCO Res 4/9.3/2/20, UNESCO Gen. Conf. Res., UNESCO doc. 20 c/Resolutions, at 10004(1978).
110See id.
111Id.
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community and that UNESCO itself was uniquely placed to contribute toward
the goal." 2
UNESCO continued its attention to this goal at a consultative meeting
between representatives of the International Organization of Journalists and
the International Federation of Journalists"3 in Paris on January 21-22, 1980.1 4
Prior to that meeting, both organizations undertook studies to examine press
problems around the world." 5 As a result of a comparison of the two studies,
a single document was drafted by the two groups working together at the
meeting. ' 6 The document itself contained a thorough investigation of the
problem of the protection of press working in dangerous regions and a series
of suggestions toward dealing with this important issue. These suggestions
include the establishment of a World Press Institute to provide a forum for
further investigation, periodic international conferences to evaluate the
position of journalists in foreign countries, and the future drawing of
international instruments to more effectively address the issue." 7 Unfortunately, the document failed to list specific suggestions for the form or content
of any such instruments." 8
Following the Paris meeting, another meeting ofjournalists' organizations
was held in April, 1980 in Mexico." 9 This meeting, organized by the Latin
American Federation of Journalists (FELAP) and attended by the IOJ, the IFJ
and the Confederation of ASEAN Journalists (CAJ), considered the document
drafted by the earlier consultative meeting and made some particular
recommendations for its application. 2 The meeting participants urged the
United Nations General Assembly to determine why earlier attempts to address
,2 See id.

,3 The IFJ is currently the world's largest organization of journalists representing 450,000
journalists in more than 100 countries. See International Federation of Journalists, http://www.
ifj.org. (last visited Jan. 20, 2001). The IFJ works for both the cultural and political freedom of
the press and for the physical protection ofjournalists. Toward that end, the IFJ has drafted an
International Code of Practice for the Safe Conduct of Journalism which provides minimum
standards for its member press organizations in the equipping of journalists working in
dangerous regions. Also toward that end, the IFJ has established an International Safety Fund
to provide humanitarian aid for journalists in need. To contribute to the Safety Fund, please
send donations to: A/C 611-0122022-66, Deutsche Bank, Ave Marnix 17, 1000 Brussels,
Belgium.
..
4 Protection of Journalists, supra note 21, at 10.
,15See id.
11 See id. at 11-19.
11 Seeid. at 15-18.
"' See id. at 18.
"9 Id. at 19.
120 See id. at 19-21.
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the issue by that organization had failed so that new, updated and corrected
attempts might be made.' 2 ' The participants also called for the immediate
establishment of an international professional commission
for the Protection
22
UNESCO.
of
auspices
the
under
of Journalists
J. MacBride Commission
The International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems,
frequently referred to as the MacBride Commission, was established by the
Director-General of UNESCO, Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, in December,
1977.123 Composed of sixteen experts, the stated purpose of the commission
was to "study the totality of communications problems in the modem world"
and draft a report that would remedy the problems. 24 Within that ambitious
scope, the Commission addressed the issue of press protection. From
December, 1977 to November, 1979, the Commission held eight meetings.' 25
The issue of press protection garnered much attention from the Commission during its fifth meeting in New Delhi, India held March 25-30, 1979.126
During that meeting, Chairman MacBride told the Commission about two
meetings he had personally convened in Paris to address the issue protecting
of the press.'2 7 These meetings were organized without the knowledge of the
28
Commission and apparently funded outside of the Commission's budget.
Prior to those meetings, Mr. MacBride drafted an international instrument
addressing the issue of press protection. The instrument cited the dangers
frequently faced by journalists working in dangerous regions and confirmed
the need for further protection, but contained few concrete, effective

"2 See id. at 19-20.
'22 See

id. at 20.
supraat note 20. The MacBride Commission, remembered as one of the most
important documents ever drafted under UNESCO authority, was also one of the most
controversial. Although the report drafted by the Commission did praise the idea of press
freedom, it also contained a variety of recommendations that seemingly supported the
communications goals of the communist and developing nations of the time. These included the
subordination of the press to the immediate goals of the governments and opposition to private
ownership of news media. For an in-depth and up-close examination of the work of The
MacBride Commission, see WILLIAM G. HARLEY, CREATIVE COMPROMISE: THE MACBRIDE
COMMISSION (1993).
1'2 See Brown,

124Harley,supra note 123, at 1.
125For an invaluable and thorough description of these proceedings, see id. at 48-88.
126 See
127 See
128 See

id. at 114-19.

id. at 116.
id.
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suggestions for the implementation of such protection.'29 One of the few
concrete suggestions made was for the establishment of a round table for
further discussion of such issues. 30 Ofparticular controversy were statements
contained in the document referring to the responsibilities of journalists for
accurate reporting."' Apparently the result of an attempt to compromise and
build support for controversial issues, the paper discussed both a code for the
protection of journalists and an international code of journalistic ethics that
mandated the licensing of journalists.'32 Both the code of ethics and the
licensing scheme were particularly distrusted by members of developed
nations who saw them as attempts to develop governmental control over the
press in developing countries.133 While some members felt the document
ought to focus specifically on press protection, others felt that protection could
not be treated separately from responsibilities."
At the conclusion of the meetings, the MacBride Commission drafted a
final report, a document of approximately 135,000 words that was later
published as a book of 275 pages. 3 ' The report declared that communication
is a basic individual right as well as a collective one, but further stressed that
the diversity of societies around the world necessitates a variety of solutions,
each adapted to the social, economic and cultural life of each individual
country. 36 As to the physical protection ofjournalists, a goal towards which
Chairman MacBride worked strenuously, the Commission declined the
opportunity to take a strong and effective stance. 37 The Commission was in
fact explicitly wary of taking such a stance, concluding that special protection
may result in journalists being shepherded by members of the local government. 3 " The Commission concluded finally and optimistically that

329 See The Protection of Journalists; document published by the International Commission
for the Study of Communication Problems, No. 90, Annex II. For the full text of the document,
see Protection of Journalists, supra note 21, at 129-36.

130See Protection of Journalists, supra note 21, at 136.
'. Seeid. at

131-33.
' See id. at 131-35.
"3 See Melissa Young, JournalistsPrecariously
Coveringthe Globe: InternationalAttempts
to Provide for Their Protection, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 135, 143-52 (1982).

See Harley, supra note 123, at 116-17.
'"See SEAN MACBRIDE, UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL
'3

ORGANIZATION, MANY VOICES, ONE WORLD: COMMUNICATION'S SOCIETY, TODAY &
TOMORROW REPORT BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF COMMUNICATION
PROBLEMS (1980).
136See id. at 253.
" See id. at 274.

. See id. at 236.
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"[]ournalists will be truly protected when everyone's rights are fully
recognized."' 3 9 The Commission did make one positive recommendation
along these lines, however. Recommendation 51 of the report calls for
UNESCO to hold a series of round tables for media personnel to address issues
of protection and to propose additional measures by which the press may be
protected." ° The final report, along with a lengthy analysis provided by
Director-General M'Bow, was submitted to the twenty-first UNESCO General4
Conference that met in Belgrade during September and October 1980.' '
Unfortunately, at the start of the conference, Director-General M'Bow
announced that the MacBride Commission report had been prepared for his
own personal use and was not on the official agenda.'42 M'Bow reportedly
made this astonishing move in order to avoid the combustion of the already
high tensions.'
K Conclusion of HistoricalInvestigation
The history sketched is certainly a dramatic one. One conclusion that can
be clearly drawn is that, notwithstanding the obvious need for such protection
and the many attempts to address the issue, little was ever actually accomplished. As William Shakespeare once wrote, though assuredly not addressing
the issue of international humanitarian law: "[I]t is a tale [t]old by an idiot, full
of sound and fury, [s]ignifying nothing."'"
III. INTERNATIONAL METHODS FOR THE PROTECTION OF JOURNALISTS

Meanwhile, the tragedy of violence against the press continues unabated.
With this in mind, this note continues with a discussion of potential, real
methods for the protection of the press and specific ways in which such
measures could be carried out. Like the prior historical analysis, this
prospective analysis is organized on a topical basis.

139See id.
'40

See id. at 265.

"' See Harley, supra note 123, at 155.
142See id.
1

See id.

144 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH,

Act 5, Scene 5.
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A. Identification Cards
The first potential method by which journalists working in war-tom regions
could be protected is the provision of identification cards, cards clearly
designating the presence of its carrier as a certified member of the press. This
method has frequently been considered and just as frequently criticized on one
ground or another. As discussed above, this method was suggested as a
workable means for protecting the press from violence as early as the
Conference of Press Experts held in Geneva in 1927 under the auspices of the
League of Nations. 4 5 In the seventy years since that meeting, the issuance of
identity cards has been proposed at nearly every major meeting or conference
dedicated to the issue of protecting the press.' 6 The effectiveness of this
method has never been fully tested, with the brief, but notable exception of the
Safety Committee in the early 1970s, an attempt that failed in the face of the
incredible practical complexities of such an effort. 47 Still, this method is
frequently considered and proposed to the present day. For example, recent
consideration of this controversial topic occurred at a media workshop held in
Lagos, Nigeria by the Nigerian Red Cross4 Society in conjunction with the
International Committee of the Red Cross. 1
The most prominent criticism leveled at identity card proposals is that the
programs simply will not work, 49 primarily because it is unclear how such
cards would actually prevent violence toward journalists. More to the point,
50
many journalists have argued that they would actually be counterproductive.'
This argument is supported to a great extent by the particularly egregious
nature of recent violence. On January 9, 1999, members of the Revolutionary
United Front entered Freetown, Sierra Leone with target lists ofjournalists and
hunted down four journalists.'
If one of the journalists murdered in cold
blood had been provided with an identification card, it would not have
protected him. In fact, by providing clear and convenient proof that he was,
in fact, a journalist, the card would have done little more than serve as his
death warrant. Although it serves as an extreme example, the violence in
Sierra Leone clearly belies the preventative value of an identification card

's

See Conference of Press Experts, supra note 28.

'"

See Protection of Journalists, supra note 21, at 39.

147 See

id.

See Odunlami,supra note 37. The workshop addressed the issue of identity cards within
a broader discussion of providing special status for journalists. See id.
149 See id.
148

1so See id.
'51 See 34 JournalistsKilled in 1999, supra note 13.
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system. Identification card systems have been similarly criticized as providing
governments with an easy means of controlling the press, a criticism leveled
at licensing schemes in general.'52
B. InternationalCriminalizationof Violence Against Journalists
The second potential method discussed is to explicitly criminalize the
conduct as a war crime within the investigative and punitive authority of
international authorities. This action would tell soldiers world wide that the
intimidation and murder of journalists as a military tactic will not easily be
permitted. Such a statement is clearly necessary in the increasingly violent
world stage.
Of course, the deterrent effect of such a law would hinge largely on the
effectiveness of its enforcement. A guerilla fighter in Serbia is not likely to
alter his behavior because his plans violate a law if he knows he will never be
charged. Unfortunately, the issue of enforcement is both critical and
particularly troublesome. Thus, determining methods by which such a law
could be enforced is an important aspect of this investigation.
C. Temporary United Nations Tribunals
The first method of enforcement arises from the simplest context involving
the war-criminalization of violence against journalists: the listing of such
violence as a war crime under the jurisdiction of the United Nations, either
within the context of the Geneva Conventions or as a more recently invoked
addition to the United Nations charter. By either method, the results would
presumably be the same. The most typical method of enforcement by the
United Nations is the establishment of a temporary international criminal
tribunal to investigate and prosecute war crimes.'53
Such tribunals have a relatively long history in the realm of international
humanitarian rights. As the saying goes, those who cannot remember the past
are condemned to repeat it.' 5' Thus, any attempt to establish an effective
tribunal must begin with an analysis of the successes and failures of those in
the past.

See Odunlami, supra note 37.
See Barrett Prinz, Note, The Treaty of Versailles to Rwanda: How the International
Community Deals with War Crimes, 6 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 553, 554 (1998).
"5 George Santayana, Reason in Common Sense, in LIFE OF REASON, ch. 12 (1905-06).
's

'"

526
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D. The Nuremberg Trial
One of the earliest and perhaps the most famous example of a temporary
military tribunal was the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg
founded by the international community, before the creation of the United
Nations itself, to investigate and try Nazi war criminals in the aftermath of the
unprecedented atrocities of WWII." 5 The decision to try the Nazi war
criminals was made pursuant to the United Nations' Moscow Declaration
drafted on November 1, 1943.56 The IMT was established under the London
Accord on August 8, 1945." 5 The London Accord provided the IMT with
jurisdiction over three general areas: war crimes, crimes against peace and
crimes against humanity. 58 After extensive investigation and debate, the IMT
decided to prosecute twenty-four defendants. 59 Of those, twenty-two were
actually tried, twelve were sentenced to death, three to life in prison, three
were acquitted and the remaining four received ten to twenty years. " One of
'5s See Resolution by Allied Governments Condemning German Terror and Demanding
Retribution (Jan. 13, 1942), reprinted in 44 Brit. & Foreign Papers, 1940-1942, at 1072 (Her
Majesty's Stationary Office, 1952).
136See id.
IS7 See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. The charter that established the
International Military Tribunal was annexed to the London Agreement. 82 U.N.T.S. 279, at
284.
158 See id. Article 6 of the IMT Charter provides:
(a) Crimes against Peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation, or waging
of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements, or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy
for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;
(b) War Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such
violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment, or
deportation to slave labor for any other purpose of civilian population of or
in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons
on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton
destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by
military necessity;
(c) Crimes against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population, before or during war, or persecutions on political, racial or
religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law
of the country where perpetrated.
Id.
'59 See Prinz, supra note 153, at 559.
1'0 Id.
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the primary problems with the IMT was its self-imposed limitation to crimes
that occurred only after the formal outbreak of the war in 1939.16 The
limitation was imposed in order to avoid criticism and perhaps later legal
attack as enforcing laws ex post facto. 62 Although those concerns are
certainly valid, the decision to limit consideration resulted in the exclusion of
many potential defendants. 63 Thus, while the IMT provided a strong
framework for the prosecution of war criminals, broader protection is
necessary for effective deterrence. Despite that limitation, however, the IMT
did succeed in demonstrating to the world that war criminals need fear
retribution from the international community."
E. InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor Yugoslavia
A more recent example of a temporary military tribunal is the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 (ICTY) 65 The ICTY faced a strong challenge
to the legality of its existence and jurisdiction as a direct result of its first
attempted prosecution, that of Dusko Tadic, the perpetrator of alleged war
crimes in connection with the operation of several prisoner camps.'6 In
response to the challenge to the ICTY's establishment, the trial chamber
concluded that the U.N. Security Council's actions in establishing the ICTY
67
were a valid exercise of power under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
In the second challenge, Tadic's attorneys argued that the ICTY was in
effect violating the rights of individual countries to try war criminals who
committed crimes within their borders.' The court first stated that it did not
have authority to review the question, but went on to hold that Tadic did not
have standing to raise the issue. 69 Finally, and most germane to the future
enforcement of violence against journalists, the court addressed Tadic's claim

16 See id. at 558-59.

162See id.
163See id. at 561.
'"Seeid.

U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
6"See Prosecutor v. Tadic, 112 I.L.R. I (Int'! Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia 1997). For
more information on the ICTY, see Prinz, supra note 153, at 565.
67 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, 105 I.L.R. 419 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia 1995).
See also Prinz, supra note 153, at 567-7 1.
'" See Prinz, supra note 153, at 567.
169 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, 105 I.L.R. 419. See also Prinz, supra note 153, at 567.
165
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that the ICTY lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the alleged crimes
because they occurred in an internal, as opposed to an international, conflict.' 70
In response to this argument, the court first concluded that Article 2,171
concerning grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva conventions, applied to both
internal and international conflicts.7 7 The court further held that claims
brought pursuant to Article 3,7 which covers violations of the law or customs
of war, applied to both international and internal conflicts. 74 Finally, the court
held that Article 5 crimes against humanity' likewise applied to internal

170 See

Prinz, supra note 153, at 567.
See ICTY Statute at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/stat2000_com.htm (last visited
Mar. 2, 2002). Article 2, Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 states:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
committing or ordering to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely the following acts against persons
or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention: (a) willful killing; (b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments; (c) willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health; (d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified
by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; (e) compelling
a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile power; (f)
willfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of a fair and
regular trial; (g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of
a civilian; (h) taking civilians as hostages.
Id.
172 See Prinz, supra note 153, at 567-68.
17 See ICTY Statute, supra note 171, art. 3. It states:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
violating the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not
be limited to: (a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons
calculated to cause unnecessary suffering; (b) wanton destruction of cities,
towns or villages, or devastation notjustified by military necessity; (c) attack,
or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages,
dwellings, or buildings; (d) seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to
institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences,
historic monuments and works of art and science; (e) plunder of public or
private property.
Id.
17' See Prinz, supra note 153, at 568.
171See ICTY Statute, supra note 171, art. 5. It states:
The international Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict,
whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian
population: (a) murder; (b) extermination; (c) enslavement; (d) deportation;
(e) imprisonment; (f) torture; (g) rape; (h) persecutions on political, racial and
religious grounds; (i) other inhumane acts.
17'
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conflicts.'76 Thus, before addressing any of the substantive issues relating to
the alleged war crimes of its first defendant, the ICTY managed to extend the
concept of war crimes prosecution for every major type of war crime to the
purely internal conflict.
Having successfully addressed the procedural difficulties of the case, the
ICTY then moved on to the fairly intricate substantive difficulties. First, the
court determined that a state of armed conflict existed in the region at all times
relevant to the case.' Further, the court concluded that all of the allegations
against Tadic were regarding actions taken within the context of the armed
conflict. 8 In so concluding, the court focused on the organization and
intensity of the conflict and on the indicative
fact that the U.N. Security
79
Council itself had become so involved.
The ICTY then addressed the allegations in turn. As to the Article 2
violations, the court concluded that the article could only apply to crimes
against people specifically protected under the provisions of the Geneva
Conventions." 0 Further, the court found that the victims were civilians, such
that Geneva Convention IV, article 4, would apply.'
To be considered
protected persons, the court concluded the civilians must have been captives
of a party to the conflict, and not nationals of an occupying party.8 2 Applying
this standard to the situation in the former Yugoslavia required a difficult
analysis. The ICTY had to determine whether Tadic's soldiers Were operating
as de facto organs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or simply as allies. 3
The court ultimately found that the groups were independent allies and, as a
result, that the civilians were not protected persons under the applicable
statute.'" Thus, the court found Tadic not guilty of eleven of the charges
against him."8"
Id.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, supranote 167, para. 140. This decision adopted a much broader
victim than that reached by the Nuremberg Tribunal. See id. In so deciding, ICTY concluded
that modem international and humanitarian law was no longer limited by the traditional nexus
requirement between crime and conflict. See id.
m See id. para. 70.
'76 See

id.
179See id.
178 See

See Prosecutor v. Tadic, 105 1.L.R. 419, supra note 167 para. 81.
See Prosecutor v. Tadic, supranote 166 para. 578.
182 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, 112 I.L.R. I (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia 1997)
para. 578.
18 See id. para 584.
'" See id. para 607.
38 See id. para 608.
'u
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F. InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor Rwanda

The most recent use of a temporary criminal tribunal occurred in Rwanda
following the systematic slaughter of somewhere between half a million and
one million Rwandans over a three month period.8 6 In response to news of the
tragedy, the U.N. Security Council established a Commission to investigate the

situation. 7 Based on the Commission's findings, the Security Council
decided to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). "I
One of the most interesting aspects of the operation of the ICTR is its
cooperation with the Rwandan national court system, an affiliation made
necessary by the extremely large number of alleged war criminals facing
prosecution.' 89 In order to address more efficiently the large number of
prosecutions necessary, Rwanda passed national legislation to govern the
responsibilities of the national court system in bringing the war criminals to
justice.'9 This cooperation is interesting for two reasons. Primarily, it would
seem that a cooperative agreement between a country and an international
tribunal would provide an extremely efficient enforcement method. In
addition, a joint condemnation from both sources should demonstrate the
conviction of the national government to investigate and enforce the crime,
perhaps minimizing the potential for criminals to flaunt the international laws
as examples of outwardly imposed morality. As such, it should work as a
particularly effective deterrent.

'" See Prinz, supra note 153, at 578. The disaster began when the Presidential Guard
murdered their political opponents including the Prime Minister and the President of the
Rwandan Supreme Court. Id. at 577-78. The massacre followed in the footsteps of the deaths
of Rwandan President Habyarimana and President Ntaryamira of Burundi in a plane crash that
may have been shot down by political opponents. Id. at 577. The unfortunate crash occurred
just eight months after the signing of the Arusha Peace Accords which were intended to bring
an end to decades of fighting between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups.
"8
See S.C. Res. 935, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/935 (1994).
188 See id. (requesting the Security-General to establish a commission to investigate Rwandan
Massacre).
t89 See Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of ConcurrentJurisdiction:The Case ofRwanda, 7
DUKE J. COM. & INT'L L. 349, 362 (1997).
"9 See id. at 358 (citing Organizationof Prosecutionsfor Offenses Constitutingthe Crime
ofGenocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed Since October 1, 1990, Organic Law No.
08/96 (Aug. 30, 1996), in Official Journalof the Republic of Rwanda (Sept. 1, 1996)). It
organizes all the defendants into one offour categories depending on the severity oftheir alleged
crimes. Id. The defendants in the most egregious category, consisting of leaders and those
involved in particularly heinous murders, were subject to the death penalty and not permitted
to plea bargain. Id. In order to maximize the court's efficiency, defendants in all three of the
other groups were allowed and encouraged to plea bargain to receive lower sentences. Id.

2002]

INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF JOURNALISTS

As promising as this aspect of the ICTR was, it was not without difficulties.
One of the main potential problems with any national government taking an
active role in the enforcement of international human rights is the perception
of discriminatory treatment.' 9' In Rwanda itself,the government is dominated
by the Tutsis.'92 Any government effort to investigate crimes will either
actually be discriminatory against the Hutus or at least perceived to be so.193
Of course, this difficulty is largely a result of the particular situation in
Rwanda itself and, thus, is not likely to be that critical in other contexts.
However, it may prove a critical limitation in the context of the protection of
the press. As we have seen, often times violence against journalists can be
traced back to the government of the nation in which it occurred."9 Thus,
while governmental cooperation, similar to that in Rwanda, could be a positive
factor in any international human rights scheme for the protection of
journalists, the international tribunal involved would also need the ability to
act independently and in direct opposition to the interests of the national
government should the need arise.
In addition to the particular problems associated with the attempt at
cooperation, the ICTR suffered from many ofthe jurisdictional difficulties also
associated with the ICTY. In fact, these problems ultimately led the Rwandan
government itself to vote against the creation of the tribunal.'" In doing so,
the government cited several substantial limitations.'" Chief among these
objections was the fact that the organizing ICTR's jurisdiction was limited to
crimes occurring during the time period between January 1 and December 31,
1994.1"' The Rwandan government also objected to the relatively small size
of the ICTR and its inability to give the death penalty.'98 These criticism of the
ICTR, like the similar ones levied against the ICTY, provide a real world
example of the limitations inherent in the use of temporary tribunals for the
enforcement of international human rights. Of course, such limitations would
...
See Prinz, supra note 153, at 581.
19

See id.

See id. Since the tragedy inRwanda was the result of ethnic tensions between the Tutsis
and Hutus, any perceived discrimination in the investigation and punishment of the war crimes
could potentially lead to further estrangement between the two ethnic groups and, as a result,
further atrocities.
"' See 24 Journalists Killed in 2000, supra note 1. The article describes examples of
violence against journalists on the part of both the government inthe form of the army and on
the part of the leading rebel group. Id.
'95See Prinz, supra note 153, at 579.
113

196 See id.
'97 See id.

19 See id.
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be even more severe in the context of press protection. Although a great deal
of press violence occurred in Rwanda and Yugoslavia and, as such, could be
addressed by the tribunals enacted to deal with both situations, press violence
often occurs independently of any larger upheaval.'" Thus, any effective
enforcement method would necessitate a tribunal with the ability to respond
quickly to a situation in which the violence against journalists is the sole
criminal act at issue.
G. InternationalCriminal Court
Although the temporary tribunals have been an important and often
effective tool in the enforcement of international law, each tribunal has been
plagued with difficulties, most notably, severe and frequently self-imposed
limitations to their jurisdiction. It is largely because of these limitations that
proponents of international protection of human rights have argued for the
creation of a permanent tribunal to investigate and prosecute war crimes, an
institution first proposed by the United Nations in 1947."2° A committee was
established to explore this acknowledged need in 1948.20' The committee then
completed a report and Draft Statute in 1951.202 After receiving comments and
further guidance from the United Nations General Assembly, the Committee
composed and submitted a revised Draft Statute in 1953.03 Due to difficulty
resulting from the Cold War, the 1953 statute marked the end of its formal
consideration by the United Nations for several decades. 2°4
The idea of a criminal court once gain received official consideration in
1989 after Trinidad and Tobago expressed concern to the United Nations about
the rampant drug trade in their region and the potential of establishing an

'" See 24 JournalistsKilled in 2000, supra note I. The article cites examples of violence
against the press occurring in Bangladesh, Brazil, Spain and other countries not currently
engaged in war or other major upheavals. Id.
2' See Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the work of itsforty-eight session,
6 May-26 July 1996, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996).
'0' See G.A. Res. 260 B (III) (1948).
202 G.A. Res. 489 (V) (1950). The Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction was

comprised of members representing Australia, Brazil, China, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, France,
India, Iran, Israel, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, Syria, the United Kingdom, the United States
and Uruguay. See id.
203 Report of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, 27 July-20 August
1953, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 12, U.N. Doc. A/2645 (1954).
204 See Lori Sinanyan, Note, The InternationalCriminalCourt: Why the United StatesShould
Sign the Statute (But Perhaps Wait to Ratify), 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 1171, 1184 (2000).
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international criminal court to more effectively deal with the issue.2" 5 As a
result of Trinidad and Tobago's interest, the United Nations requested that the
International Law Commission (ILC) consider the establishment of such a
tribunal. 2° In 1993, in the midst of the establishment of the ICTY, the ILC
completed a Draft Statute for the proposed International Criminal Court and
submitted it to the General Assembly. 0 7 After receiving comments from the
United Nations. member states, the ILC adopted a revised, Draft Statute for an
International Criminal Court in 1994 (Draft Statute).208 In 1994, the General
Assembly created an ad hoc committee to evaluate the Draft Statute and
propose revisions.' 9 The committee met for two two-week sessions in 1995
and concluded that more work was needed to draft a workable framework for
an international criminal court.210 Later that same year, the General Assembly
created a new committee to address the creation of an international criminal
tribunal and draft the text for an appropriate convention doing so. 2 " The
Preparatory Committee, in 1998, drafted the text of a statute establishing an
international criminal court (Rome Statute). 2 " At a diplomatic conference
held in Rome from June 15 to July 17, 1998, the member states
voted to accept
21
the draft treaty and establish the court by a vote of 120-7. 3
The International Criminal Court, as established and defined by the Rome
Statute, has a potential to combat violence against journalists unequaled by
prior international, humanitarian tribunals for several reasons. Primarily, the
Rome Statute gives the International Court jurisdiction over individuals who
commit the crimes listed under Article 5 of the statute." 4 This jurisdiction
extends to people accused of crimes in a wide variety of situations. First,
accused people are subject to the jurisdiction of the court if they are citizens

205

See Brian D. Keatts, Note, The InternationalCriminal Court: Far From Perfect, 20

N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L &COMP. L. 137, 141 (2000).
206

See id.

See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-fifth session, 45
U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10 at 255, 335, U.N. Doc. A/48/10 (1993).
20' See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session,
49 U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994).
209 See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, 50 U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22, U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (1995).
210 See id.
211 See G.A. Res. 50/46 (1995) (noting that the United Nations Preparatory Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court was composed of representatives from more
than 120 countries).
212 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999.
213 See id. (noting that the total vote was 120-7, with 21 abstentions).
214 See id. art. 25.
207
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of a party state or if the alleged crime occurred in a party state.2" 5 Secondly,
the court has jurisdiction over crimes committed by citizens of states that are
non-parties but have formally accepted the jurisdiction of the court." 6 Finally,
the court has jurisdiction over any Article 5 crime that the United Nations
Security Council has referred to the prosecutor.2"'
In addition to this broad, general jurisdiction, the court's jurisdiction has
been extended by the Rome Statute by a variety of specific measures, as well.
The court's jurisdiction extends to individuals who are indirectly responsible
for a crime, either by ordering, soliciting, aiding or abetting the commission
of the crime.2" Also, the court retains jurisdiction over alleged wrongdoers
regardless of their official capacity as a politician, elected official or military
officer.21 9 The Rome Statute further states that a person accused of a listed
crime cannot avoid the jurisdiction of the court by claiming that the actions at
issue were taken as a result of military orders to do so." Thus, jurisdictionally
at least, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides an
unprecedented ability to enforce international, humanitarian law. It does so,
practically regardless of the nationality of the alleged criminal. Or the
political situation of the country in which the alleged crimes occurred.
The International Criminal Court is not without its critics, however.
Although the United States played a vocal role in calling for the implementation of such a court, in recent years U.S. opposition has been the single most
effective obstacle to the implementation of the court. 22' This opposition
culminated in the United States' decision to vote against the creation of the
court at the Rome Conference in 1998, one of only seven countries to take
such a stance.22 Among the criticisms leveled at the court by the United
States include the general fear that the court will override national sovereignty
and prosecute U.S. citizens or servicemen for acts in which the United States
itself has determined the alleged wrongdoer has no liability. =3 An additional

211
216

See id. art. 12(2).
See id. art. 12(3).

See id. art. 13(b).
See id. art. 25(3)(b)(c).
219 See id. art. 27-28.
220 See id. art. 33.
217

218

"' For an effective and enlightening examination ofthe United States objections to the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, see John Seguin, Denouncing the International
Criminal Court: An Examination of US. Objections to the Rome Statute, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 85

(2000).
222

See id. at 87.

See id. at 92. In response to this particular concern, the treaty negotiators added a
provision to the treaty requiring the prosecutor to notify the involved state of his or her interest
2
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criticism leveled by U.S. negotiators is that the definitions of crimes
punishable by the court are overly vague.2 4 Much of the opposition to the
criminal court has come from U.S. Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who has described the statute as a
monster that needs to be slain."'
H. Regional Human Rights Tribunals
Another method by which laws protecting journalists could be enforced is
by the human rights organizations that have been developed creating and
applying international humanitarian law to particular regions of the world.
Essentially, such an approach may be more effective simply because the
people on whom the laws will be imposed may view them as being selfimposed rather than imposed by other countries with differing world views and
different goals. Such an approach, focusing on each regions's own conception
of its values, appears particularly important when one looks back at the
failures of the United Nations' and UNESCO attempts to protect journalists
and press freedom. These failures were due largely to third world objections
over the imposition of world values, as discussed above.
L African Commission
One of these regional organizations that could take a lead role in the
protection ofjournalists is the African Commission on Human and Peoples'
Rights (African Commission). The African Commission grew out of an effort
by the member states of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to take a
stronger role in fostering and protecting human rights.' First drafted in 1979,
the second draft of the Charter of the African Commission (African Charter) 1 7
went into effect on October 21, 1986, having been ratified by fifty of the fiftyin investigation. See id. The country, then, has the option of investigating the matter itself, a
decision that the prosecutor can only override if it can convince the Pre-Trial Chamber of the
court that the state is failing to investigate adequately. See id.
24 See id. at 96.
25

See id. at 99.

See Clement Nwankho, The OA U and Human Rights, 4 J. DEMOCPACY 50-51 (1993).
The OAU charter was adopted in 1963 in the aftermath of decolonization to wipe out the
vestiges of colonialism and develop political unity among the African nations. A significant
criticism of the OAU has been its failure to focus on individual human rights and its reluctance
to interfere with the internal affairs of its member countries. The African Commission thus arose
in an attempt to remedy the criticized aspects of the OAU. See id.
226

" See OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3, Rev. 5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
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three OAU member countries.22 The charter itself is a particularly strong
statement in favor of human rights.229 It guarantees a wide variety of rights,
including equal protection, freedom from ex post facto laws, the right to self
determination, the right to work and the right to education.130 The charter is
nearly unique among such international compacts in its focus on such a broad
range of human rights.23 '
The enforcement of the rights guaranteed by the charter is effected, not by
a court, but by the African Commission itself.23 Aggrieved states or
individuals can submit petitions to the commission for acts by member States
in violation of the Charter. 2 3 The commission is charged with the responsibility to evaluate the petition, determine if it meets the requirement of an
admissible complaint and then work with both parties to reach a consensus,
and ultimately prepare a report denoting its findings. 4 Once a decision is
reached on the issue, however, the commission has no authority to bind the
parties to the decision."3
The lack of a judicial body with international jurisdiction may seem a
severe weakness of the Charter but was in fact a considered and rational
decision by the drafters to embrace a strategy of enforcement based on
negotiation as opposed to confrontation, a strategy which the drafters saw as
more representative of a traditional African means for solving disputes. 6
Although this limitation is severe, it does not necessarily preclude the
commission from playing a critical role in the future protection of the press.
Hope remains because of Article 66 of the Charter,2 7 which provides that the
charter may be amended or supplemented by special agreements. Thus, the
charter could be amended to provide for the establishment of a court with
properjurisdiction to enforce the Charter's goals.2 s The method by which the

228

See EVELYN

ANKUMAH, THE AFRICAN COMuSSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS I

(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) (1996) As of approximately 1996, Ethiopia, Eritrea and South
Africa had yet to ratify the charter. See id. at n. 1.
229 See OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3, Rev. 5, supra note 227.
'2 See id. arts.
23 Seeki.

1-26.

232
23

See id. art. 30.
See id.art. 47.

2m

See id. arts. 52, 56-57.

23' See id. art. 58-59.

"' See T. Huaraka, The Effects ofMilitary Coupsd'Etats and Regimes on Human Rights in

Africa, Archive des Volkerrechts, 26(l) 1988, p. 53.
237 See OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3, Rev. 1. art. 66. Stating that "special protocols or
agreements may, if necessary, supplement the provisions of the present charter." Id.
238 See

id.
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African Commission could play a significant role in the protection of
journalists working in war-tom regions in Africa therefore is clear. First, the
Charter would have to be amended to include violence against journalists as
a crime receivable by the commission. 9 If that were done, then an aggrieved
individual or non-governmental organization could bring a written complaint
about such violence to the Secretary of the Commission. 2 ° The commission
then would have the responsibility of investigating the complaint."4 For such
a system to be effective, however, an African court with sufficient jurisdiction
to enforce the commission's decrees would have to be established, as
discussed supra.
Furthermore, the charter basically limits the jurisdiction of the commission
to acts committed by the governments of member states. 242 Thus, violence
against journalists would only be punishable if it could be attributed to the
government of a member state.243 Thus, to be a truly effective force for justice
in this area, the charter would have to be further amended to extend the
commission's jurisdiction to actions taken by rebel groups, other independent
organizations and even individuals themselves.
J. Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Another regional human rights organization that could play a pivotal role
in a future effort to physically protect the press is the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights (Inter-American Court). The Inter-American Court was created
by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights with the drafting of the
American Convention on Human Rights in San Jose, Costa Rica, on November
22, 1969.2" The primary purpose of the court, as defined by the court's
founding statute, is to apply the humanitarian rules listed in the Inter-American
Convention on Human Rights through both advisory and adversarial,
contentious jurisdiction.245
29

See id. art. 66.

240 See id. art. 55.
241 See id.
242 See

id. art. 47.

243

See OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3, Rev. 5, supra note 227, art. 47.

244

See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, pt. 2, ch. 7, 1144 U.N.T.S.

123.

" See id. pt. 2, ch. 8. The advisory jurisdiction is prospective and is designed to allow the
court to avoid future disputes. The contentious jurisdiction, on the other hand, is designed to
resolve current conflicts. As such, it is the contentious jurisdiction which will play a more
significant role inthe protection ofjournalists and thus it isthat jurisdiction with which this note
is particularly concerned. Id.
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The Inter-American Court begins its application of contentious jurisdiction
when an aggrieved party brings a complaint that a member has breached the
obligations of the Inter-American Commission. 2" The judicial process itself
occurs in the form of a public hearing which ends in the presentment of an
unappealable opinion." If the court finds a violation has occurred, it can then
order reparations be made." A particularly interesting aspect of the InterAmerican system is its enforcement provisions, which are much more
extensive than most humanitarian regimes.24 9
Of course, for the Inter-American Court to play a pivotal role in the
protection of the press, the Commission would have to be amended to include
press violence as a prohibited activity. The method for doing so is relatively
easy, however, and the amendment process was evidenced in 1985 when the
General Assembly of the OAS approved the Protocol of Cartagena of Indias
20
and thus amended the charter to more effectively prevent and punish torture.
The protocol provided a detailed definition of the offense of torture and
established an improved scheme for its investigation and punishment. 25 ' The
new protocol entered into force on February 28, 1987, thirty days after the
second member state ratified the language. 2 It's first application in a criminal
trial occurred in 1998.253 An amendment to include violence against
journalists would likely be very similar in form and function to the torture
protocol.
K. The European Court of Human Rights

A third regional human rights organization that could play an important
role in the protection of the press is the European Court of Human Rights
(European Court). Established in 1959 by the European Convention on
'4 See id.
247

art 48-50.

See id. art 67.

See id. art. 68.
See id. The statute mandates that member states will comply with the judgements of the
court. Id. Further, the statute allows that compensatory damages judgements may be executed
in the country concerned in accordance with that country's domestic procedure governing the
execution ofjudgements against the state. Id.
250 See Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Dec. 9, 1985, O.A.S.T.S.
No. 67, 25 I.L.M. 519. The Convention was adopted in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia at the
fifteenth regular session of the OAS General Assembly. See id.
2'
See id.
252 See id.
5' See Paniagua Morales et al., Judgment on the Preliminary Objections of Jan. 25, 1996
CASE #, Inter-Amer. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) para. 3 (1996.
24

249
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Human Rights,254 the original intent of the court was to put teeth behind the
rights enumerated in the European Convention. 2" Under the terms of the
convention, a claim may be brought in two ways. First, a claim may be
brought to the attention of the commission by any state party to the convention.256 Secondly, a complaint may be brought to the commission by any
person, non-governmental organization or group of individuals that claim to
be aggrieved by a violation of the convention.257 Once the commission has
agreed to accept a complaint brought through one of these two processes, it is
directed to begin an investigation into the facts of the complaint.258 The states
involved with the decision are directed to furnish all facilities necessary for the
effective conduct of the investigation.259 In investigating and attempting to
resolve the complaint, the commission's first goal is to attempt to secure a
friendly settlement.2" Failing that, the commission must then write a report
containing an opinion as to whether a breach has occurred.2 6 262Then, the
commission report is transmitted to the Committee of Ministers.
After the Committee of Ministers receives the commission report, one of
two things may happen. First, within a period of three months after the
transmission, the issue may be referred to the European Court of Human
Rights (European Court).263 Each case brought before the European Court will
be considered by a chamber composed of seven judges, including an ex officio
member who is either a national of a concerned state party or a judge chosen
by the member state. 2' The chamber then evaluates the complaint to

u See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened
for signature Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5 (Council of Europe). The European Convention was
the first international alliance to provide for the protection of human rights in treaty form.
"55See id. The rights guaranteed by the Convention include freedom of thought, religion, the

right of respect for his privacy and the right to be free from torture and slavery.
' See id. art. 24. The state party may refer the complaint to the Commission through the
Secretary General of the Council of Europe.
2" See id. art. 25. According to the terms of the agreement, such complaints must be
deposited with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe who shall and transmit copies
publish the complaint and to each of the state members of the convention.
28 See id. art. 28.
59

See id.

260 See id.

2' See id. art. 32.
262See id.

"' See id. art. 48. The European Court consists of one judge from each member state. The
members are elected by the Consultative Assembly from a list of persons nominated by the
Member states of the Council. See id.
26

See id. art. 43.
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determine whether a violation has occurred.265 If it concludes that a violation
has occurred, the court will then give a final judgement, binding on the
member states, that will be executed under the supervision of the Committee
of Ministers. 2" If the case is not referred to the European Court, the Committee of Ministers must then decide by a two-thirds vote whether a violation of
the convention has occurred.267 If they find that a violation has occurred, the
Committee of Ministers can prescribe measures that are binding on states that
are parties to the convention.268
Although the convention appears to provide an extensive and effective
method for the enforcement of the rights enumerated therein, it is plagued by
a number of fairly severe limitations. One limitation on the jurisdiction of the
European Commission is that it may only address complaints that are brought
to the commission after all domestic remedies have been exhausted.269
Another limitation is that the language of the convention apparently limits
relief to violations that are the result of decisions or measures taken by
authority of a member state of the Council .270 As we have seen in other
contexts, such a limitation would effectively prevent the European Court from
protecting manyjournalists, as much of the violence is the result of individuals
or groups not attributable to a member state.27'
In order to make the European Court a significant force for the protection
of journalists, the first step would be an amendment to the European
Convention listing violence against journalists as an explicitly proscribed act.
Unfortunately, there is no language in the convention itself which refers to an
amendment process. 272 The means by which the convention has been
historically amended is through the addition of protocols. 2 73 Since the
ratification of the original treaty, four protocols have been added. 274 The

265 See id.

m"See id. arts. 51-54.
See id. art. 32.

267

' See id. The Committee of Ministers is also enabled to provide a specific time period
during which the party must take the prescribed measures.
2"9 See id. art. 26. Furthermore, complaints must be brought within six months from the date
on which the final domestic decision was made.
270 See id. art. 50.
171 See A.H. Robertson, Human Rights in Europe app. 1-4 (1997).
272See id.
273 See

id.

274See id.

at app. 1-4. The First and Fourth Protocols deal with the enumeration of protected
rights in addition to those listed in the convention. The Second Protocol confers on the European
Court the competence to give advisory opinions. The Third Protocol makes a series of specific
amendments to the convention.
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process of amendment by protocol is far from easy, however. It requires
ratification by a significant number of the member states of the convention.275
For the European Court to protect journalists, a Fifth Protocol delineating the
particular acts prohibited would have to be drafted and sufficiently ratified to
enter into force.
IV. CONCLUSION

The primary conclusion of this investigation is simply that there is no
current adequate international scheme for the protection ofjournalists working
in dangerous regions. All too frequently, the perpetrators of these horrible
crimes go unpunished. As a result, it appears that many military groups seem
to view such violence as a legitimate method to silence criticism and forward
their cause.
That said, the good news is that there exists a basic enforcement infrastructure, consisting of currently extant regional human rights tribunals and the
United Nations. These organizations have the potential, at least, to play a
major role in the protection ofjournalists. Further, shifting these tribunals into
this new role would require, as a general matter, a relatively small number of
changes to the current schemes. Amending the treaties underlying the various
international organizations is typically a straightforward process. In many
cases, amendments expanding the rights covered by the treaties have already
been proposed and accepted. Such additions provide blueprints for the sort of
expansion necessary for the adequate protection of the press.
What such an alteration would require, however, is the desire on the part
of the international community to address the current problems facing
journalists throughout the globe. Although various organizations such as the
Committee to Protect Journalists and the Red Cross are working to publicize
the issue, it has been a long while since the international community has
addressed it in a formal manner. Since journalists are frequently the sole
source of reliable information on the successful implementation of every
international humanitarian goal, the importance of this goal cannot be
overstated.
Of the particular methods for the enforcement of international human rights
addressed throughout this investigation, the clear necessity is for some form
of a permanent international tribunal. In a perfect world, an International

27 See id. at app. 2.

The actual number of ratifications required is determined by the
language of the protocol itself. For example, Article 6 of the First Protocol states that the
protocol will enter into force after the deposit of ten instruments of ratification.
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Criminal Court would work hand-in-hand with the several regional criminal
tribunals to provide a balanced, world-wide enforcement scheme that can
address particular regional issues with flexibility and effectiveness. Such a
scheme would better ensure that journalists could ply their trade in peace and
safety, no matter where they are working. That is not to say, of course, that the
current proposed incarnation of the International Criminal Court is not without
its problems. However, the absolute necessity of a permanent tribunal
certainly counsels for further cooperation until the United States and the
international community can work out their differences and agree on a
comprehensive, effective tribunal. Failing that, the responsibility would
necessarily fall on the regional tribunals alone to step up and protect
journalists working in their respective regions. While not perfect, such a
scheme would certainly be an improvement to the current practice.
While working as a journalist in war-tom and transitional regions will
remain a dangerous profession, such action will ensure that journalists
everywhere will know that their critical work is respected and appreciated by
the international community. More importantly, military groups throughout
the world will act knowing that there will be consequences for their actions.
When the pen is once again made mightier than the sword, the world will be
a brighter, freer place.

